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Abstract 
Differential  enforcement  of  employment  protection  by  explicit  design  of  the 
legislation, for example through exemptions for small firms, has been exploited in a 
growing body of research. However, little is known about the effects of differential 
enforcement that is not defined by the letter of the law, presumably due to the lack of 
data. Our study incorporates aspects of both types of differential enforcement as we 
combine the evaluation of a partial reform with information on the more difficult-to-
observe  enforcement  of  the  same  reform  in  collective  agreements.  We  analyse  a 
reform of notice periods for employer-initiated separations in Sweden, which reduced 
the notice periods for newly hired older workers substantially but implied minor or no 
changes  in  the notices  for  younger workers.  The reform  was  initiated  at  different 
times  depending  on  collective  agreement.  These  circumstances  provide  ample 
opportunity for the identification of its effects. Our findings indicate heterogeneous 
effects across collective agreements. Despite differences in terms of dynamics and 
size, a positive effect on hirings is found for all agreements. In most cases, our results 
also show an increase in separations, indicating an increase in employment turnover. 
A salient feature of the results is that the estimated effects increase with the treatment 
dose, i.e., the size of the reduction in notice periods across different age groups. 
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Employment protection legislation may be enforced in different ways. One type of 
differential  enforcement  results  from  the  explicit  design  of  the  legislation,  while 
another type is not defined by the letter of the law. The former typically stipulates 
differential treatment across groups of workers or types of firms. For example, in 
several countries employment protection legislation is less stringent in small firms. 
The other guise of differential enforcement is more elusive in its character, relating to 
implementation in collective agreements and enforcement in the judiciary, but is not 
necessarily of lesser importance for the effects of the legislation.  
Exemptions  for  small  firms  in  employment  protection  legislation  provide 
suitable control groups (for example, firms below or above the size threshold), which 
have  been  exploited  in  recent  within-country  studies  of  partial  reforms  (see  the 
extensive surveys of employment protection research by Skedinger, 2010 and 2011). 
These studies add to the growing evidence that more stringent legislation reduces job 
and worker flows and examine a variety of other outcomes.
1 However, little is known 
about the effects of differential enforcement of employment protection legislation that 
is not defined by the letter of the law,  presumably due to the lack of data. Fraisse, 
Kramarz and Prost (2011) and Okudaira (2008) exploited the variations in judicial 
discretion  across  reg ions.  Fraisse  et  al.  (20 11)  examined  various  indicators 
characterizing the enforcement of labour regulation by labour courts  and Okudaira 
(2008) considered the assignment of judges to Japanese prefectures. Their conclusion 
is that enforcement matters. When legislation is applied in a more stringent way (for 
example  through an  exogenous allocation of more judges), its effects on labour 
market outcomes, such as employment and job flows, are stronger.  
Our study incorporates aspects of both types of differential enforcement as we 
combine the evaluation of a partial reform in Sweden targeted towards a specific age 
group with information on the more difficult -to-observe enforcement of the same 
reform in collective agreements. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first 
one to use  detailed information on both partial reform and  on enforcement across 
collective agreements to examine the effects of employment protection legislation.
2   
                                                 
1 For studies on job and worker flows, see, for example, von Below and Skogman Thoursie (2010), 
Kugler and Pica (2008), Martins (2009) and Schivardi and Torrini (2008).  
2 Cappellari, Dell’Aringa and Leonardi (2011), exploits the similarly staggered structure of collective 
agreements in Italy to examine the effects of fixed-term employment and apprenticeship reforms on job 
reallocation and labour productivity, but do not identify effects through partial reform, as defined by 
us.     2 
 
Partial  employment  protection  reforms  have  been  introduced  in  many 
countries  to  improve  the  labour  market  prospects  for  older  workers.  In  Sweden, 
legislative changes in the Employment Protection Act (EPA) in 1997 reduced  the 
firing costs for employees aged 45 and over with the explicit purpose of increasing the 
job-finding probabilities and lowering unemployment among older workers. The pre-
reform rules regarding the terms of notice for employer-initiated separations were 
based on the age of the employee, whereas the new rules are based on tenure. For 
newly hired, older workers, the reform implied a shorter notice period. The change 
was substantial for the oldest age group: a reduction in notice from six months to one 
month, equivalent to 42 percent (5/12) of an annual salary. For younger employees, 
smaller  or  no  reductions  were  introduced.  Partial  reforms  in  other  countries  with 
similar aims have typically used layoff taxes as the policy instrument, with higher 
taxes imposed on firms dismissing older workers.  
An important feature of employment protection legislation in Sweden is that it 
is  optional,  implying  that  parts  of  the  legislation  can  be  undone  in  collective 
agreements  between  employers  and  trade  unions.  Compared  to  other  countries, 
legislation  in  Sweden  seems  to  be  particularly  far-reaching  in  this  respect.  The 
possibility to deviate from the legislation through collective agreements applies to 
rules regarding notice, which means that it cannot be taken for granted that legislative 
changes in the EPA gain legal force in all sectors of the labour market. In several 
OECD countries – for example, Austria, Canada, Germany, Japan and the United 
States  – provisions for notice in  collective agreements  are more generous  than in 
legislation, although in some countries coverage of these agreements is low (Venn, 
2009). 
The EPA reform in 1997 has several attractive properties that make it suitable 
for evaluating the effects of employment protection. First, the reform was targeted 
towards older workers, so younger workers can be used as controls. Our prediction, in 
line  with  conventional  theory,  is  that  shorter  notices  of  termination  increase  the 
probability  of  hiring  among  older  workers.  Second,  because  notice  periods  were 
reduced by varying degrees among workers aged 25 – 44, ranging from 1 to 4 months, 
and not reduced at all among the youngest (aged 18 – 24), a stronger test of the 
hypothesis is possible. We expect the probability of hiring to increase monotonically 
with the treatment dose. Third, the possibility for employers and unions to opt out of 
the legislation provides another source of identification on which we have collected 
extensive  data.  In  some  collective  agreements,  the  changes  in  the  EPA  were 3 
 
implemented with a delay of several years, so some of the older workers were not 
subject to treatment in 1997 and thus form an additional suitable control group. Our 
hypothesis is that stricter enforcement of the legislation entails stronger effects on 
hirings.  
Conventional theory not only predicts that hirings will increase with shorter 
notices, but also that separations should increase. We therefore tested for the effect on 
separations,  using  the  same  methodology  as  described  above.  The  theoretical 
prediction regarding employment is ambiguous. To the extent that hirings increase 
more than firings, employment increases. However, the EPA reform was designed in 
such  a  way  that  only  workers  recruited  after  1997  were  subject  to  the  new  rules 
regarding notice periods. The old rules continue to apply to workers hired before 1997 
that have remained with the firm. Because the remaining workers were not subject to 
the reductions in notice, we expect the reform to have a larger effect on hirings than 
on separations, at least in the short run.  
In  contrast  to  the  EPA  reform,  the  idea  behind  many  partial  employment 
protection reforms in other countries has been to make it more difficult for firms to 
dismiss workers in the protected group. For France, Behaghel, Crépon and Sedillot 
(2008) find perverse effects of layoff taxes. The hiring probability for older workers 
was reduced, and no benefits in the form of fewer dismissals were achieved. Similar 
results  have  been  demonstrated  by  Acemoglu  and  Angrist  (2001)  concerning 
legislation in the United States aimed at protecting disabled workers. In their analysis 
of layoff taxes for the elderly in Austria, Schnalzenberger and Winter-Ebmer (2009) 
obtained more encouraging results:  the policy reduced layoffs among the targeted 
group, but these effects were thwarted by the substitution of younger workers for 
older ones at large firms.  Our  data  on  hirings  and  separations  originate  from  a 
large  register-based  matched  employer-employee  data  set  from  Statistics  Sweden 
covering the period 1990 – 2005. For each individual in the data set, we observe 
notices  (measured  in  months)  based  on  information  from  the  relevant  collective 
agreements and the EPA (if applicable). The notice is based on the age and/or tenure, 
depending on the period and the collective agreement, which differs for manual and 
non-manual workers in the same industry. We also have ample information on other 
individual and firm variables likely to influence worker turnover. 
Our  findings  indicate  heterogeneous  effects  across  collective  agreements. 
Despite differences in terms of dynamics and size, a positive effect on hirings is found 
for all agreements. With the exception of manual workers in engineering, our results 4 
 
also show an increase in separations, indicating an increase in employment turnover. 
A salient feature of the results is that the estimated effects increase with the treatment 
dose,  i.e.,  the  size  of  the  reduction  in  months  of  the  notices  across  different  age 
groups.   
 
 
2. Labour Market Reforms in 1997 
 
In  this  section,  we  discuss  notice  reform  in  the  EPA  and  its  implementation  in 
collective  agreements  and  calculate  the  consequences  for  the  expected  discounted 
firing costs. We also describe other labour market reforms in 1997 that could impinge 
on our results.  
 
2.1 The Notice Reform and Its Implementation in Collective Agreements  
Comprehensive  legislation  regarding  employment  protection  in  Sweden  was 
introduced in the Employment Protection Act (EPA) of 1974. Some legislation in this 
field had been in place before 1974, specifically targeting older workers. In 1971, 
special rules were introduced regarding the notices for employees aged 45 or older 
(SOU 1973:7). Before the new legislations in 1971 and 1974, the legal system of 
employment  protection  was  based  almost  exclusively  on  collective  agreements 
between  employers  and  trade  unions  and  the  application  of  case  law.  The  rules 
regarding notices in the EPA were based on the age of the employee and not on tenure 
(as was the case in most collective agreements at the time). The legislators argued that 
older  workers  needed  special  protection.  Rules  based  on  tenure  were  seen  as 
detrimental to labour mobility in this group because seniority capital would be lost for 
workers changing jobs (Regeringens proposition, 1973:129). According to the EPA, 
layoffs  should  be  based  on  the  last-in-first-out  principle,  and  the  seniority  capital 
accumulated by older workers cannot be transferred to a new employer.   
By 1996, the views among legislators regarding the notices for older workers 
had changed completely. Age-based notices were considered counter-productive for 
older  workers.  Shorter  notices,  it  was  argued,  would  increase  the  propensity  for 
employers to hire older workers (Regeringens proposition, 1996/97:16). One reason 
behind  the  change  of  focus  from  labour  mobility  to  new  hirings  was  the  rise  in 
unemployment since 1974. Figure 1 shows the diverging patterns of unemployment 
for older and younger persons in the years preceding the reform. In the wake of the 5 
 
economic crisis of the early 1990s, unemployment rates started to decline for the 
young in 1993, whereas rates continued to increase for older persons up to 1997.  
 
- Figure 1 about here - 
  
The new bill was presented to the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) on October 
24, 1996. The reform of the notice periods gained legal force on January 1, 1997. The 
full details of the reform are presented in Table 1. The pre-reform rules were based on 
the age of the employee, with a scale starting from a one-month notice for employees 
younger than 25 and ending with a maximum of a six-month notice for employees 
aged 45 or older. Rules in the new legislation were based on tenure. Employees with 
tenure shorter than two years were entitled to a notice of one month, while the rules 
stipulated up to six months of notice for employees with a tenure of at least 10 years. 
No  changes  in  the  notice  period  for  employee-initiated  separations,  which  is  one 
month, were enacted in the reform.  
 
- Table 1 about here - 
     
A long period of transition occurred before the law became effective for all 
workers. The old rules continued to apply to workers employed with the same firm 
after January 1, 1997, to the extent that these rules were more favourable for the 
worker. Because the EPA was optional, collective agreements between employers and 
trade  unions  could  deviate  from  the  EPA.  Thus,  only  newly  hired  workers  were 
initially affected by the legal changes and only in certain areas of the labour market 
because the specific implementation could vary, depending on the agreement. Hence 
we  expect  to  find  larger  effects  on  hirings  than  on  separations  in  the  short  term 
following the reform. The EPA reform could potentially induce substitution across 
age  groups  (as  was  indeed  found  for  the  Austrian  layoff  tax  in  the  study  by 
Schnalzenberger  and Winter-Ebmer, 2009). However, the Swedish  reform  implied 
only  small  differences  in  notice  across  close  age  groups  –  one  month  –  so  the 
employers’ gain from substitution should be limited.  
Table 2 provides an overview of the implementation of the new legislation 
regarding  notices  in  the  collective  agreements  (more  details  can  be  found  in  the 6 
 
Appendix, Table A.1.).
3 We consider agreements for both manual and non -manual 
workers in engineering, construction and retail. These agreements   are among the 
largest agreements in the labour market.  
 
- Table 2 about here - 
  
In the collective agreements considered by us, there  seem to be two different 
procedural rules  regarding the implementation of changes in the EPA regarding 
notice.  According  to  the  first  rule,  the  collective  agreement  applies  the  current 
regulations in the EPA regarding notice and any changes in legislation in this respect 
are applied as they gain legal force, regardless of whether a new agreement has been 
negotiated or not.  This is the procedure adopted in the Engineering Agreement for 
manuals. The second procedural rule allows for more discretion, as any changes have 
to be specified in the agreements. However, the date of implementation is restricted 
since the current  agreement has to expire first, which means that that the old rules 
continue to apply until a new agreement is enforced.  The second procedural rule  is 
used in construction, retail and for non-manuals in engineering. Thus our agreements 
either implement the legislation regarding notice directly or supplants it, which makes 
the interpretation of the enforcement in the collective agreements straightforward.
4  
Before  the  reform  of  the  legislation,  two  agreements  followed  the  rules 
according to the law rather closely, namely those for manual workers in engineering 
and retail. The other agreements set up their own rules, based on  the  age of the 
employee (manual construction workers) or on a combination of age and tenure (non-
manuals in engineering and construction) . The changes in the EPA in 1997 were 
implemented  in  all  of  the  agreements  but  at  different  points  in  time.  In  the 
Engineering Agreement for manual workers the rules were implemented on January 1, 
1997, while they were adopted with a delay of up to four ye ars in other agreements. 
For non-manual workers in engineering, the rules were implemented  on February 1, 
2001. Manual workers in construction are covered by three agreements, with new 
rules introduced during 2000 and 2001. Workers in retail are covered by a substantial 
number of different agreements, depending on  the type of products or services sold; 
                                                 
3 Individual agreements are also allowed on the condition that the periods of notice are longer than 
those specified by law and that the agreement is not in conflict with a collective agreement that the 
employer and the employee are bound by. 
4 Legal interpretation of changes in EPA seems to be more uncertain, however, in agreements stating 
that the rules are “complements to the EPA” (see the discussion in the annual report of the National 
Mediation Office, 2009). There are no such formulations in the agreements considered by us.  7 
 
however, for manual workers in this sector, almost all of the agreements specify the 
same rules regarding notices. The reform date for these workers was July 1, 2001. The 
rules for non-manual workers are much more heterogeneous in this respect and have 
not been included in the table. Table 2 shows that the changes in the EPA in 1997 
have had an important influence on collective agreements. Presumably, the arguments 
put forward in favour of the new legislation have gained acceptance among employers 
and trade unions. This observation begs the question why collective agreements were 
so diverse with respect to notices before the reforms. We do not try to answer this 
question in the paper. Instead, we take the diversity for granted and use this source of 
variation  to  identify  the  effects  of  employment  protection  legislation.  Another 
question  relates  to  the  differences  in  the  timing  of  reform  implementation  across 
agreements. The age structure among employees in retail (with many young workers) 
could have made it less pressing to implement the reform in that sector, but the slow 
implementation for non-manuals in engineering (with considerably older workers on 
average) does not fit this explanation.
5   
For workers in firms not covered by  the  collective agreements, the EPA 
applies. In Sweden,  approximately 90 percent of employees and virtually all larger 
firms are covered by such agreements. 
In principle, workers and employers  may anticipate employment protection 
reform and adjust their behaviour accordingly in various ways.  Prior to this reform, 
older workers could seek employment in other firms  before January 1, 1997 to take 
advantage of the provisionary rules requiring longer notices for hirings that occurred 
before that date. Employers could potentially gain by dismissing relatively young 
workers with long tenure earlier, before the reform. However,  because most young 
workers have short tenure and long -tenured workers are protected by the seniority 
rules in the EPA, employers  had limited benefits from anticipating the reform.  The 
reform was likely not anticipated in a way that could affect our results because the bill 
was presented to the Riksdag on October 24, 1996, and it was uncertain until October 
whether the major trade union for manual workers, LO, would be able to successfully 
block the reform, according to newspaper accounts at the time (see Sedvallson, 1996). 
In the unlikely event that the 1997 reform was anticipated, our estimated effects of the 
reform on hirings and separations would be biased downwards. We regard the risk of 
                                                 
5 Table A.3 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics on age and other characteristics for workers 
in different collective agreements. 8 
 
anticipation to be larger for the subsequent implementations of the reform for non-
manual workers in engineering and in construction and retail.   
 
2.2 Consequences of the Notice Reform for Expected Discounted Firing Costs 
To estimate the expected discounted costs due to the reform, we constructed an index 
based  on  the  formula  proposed  by  Heckman  and  Pagés-Serra  (2000).  This  index 
measures the expected dismissal costs at the time a worker is hired:  
 
 




?−1 1 − 𝗿?  ??,?,?+? + ???,?+1
?? +  1 − ? ??,?+1
??   
 
 
where j denotes the collective agreement that the worker is bound by, s is the age 
group of the worker, t is the time period (years), T is the maximum tenure of a worker, 
β is the discount factor, δ is the probability of not being laid off, b is the advance 
notice  (in  months),  a is  (in  our  interpretation
6)  the probability that a dismissal is 
judged to be with just cause should the case be opened in court,  S
jc is the severance 
pay associated with dismissals with just cause, and S
uc is the severance pay in case a 
court rules that the dismissal is without just cause.   
Like Heckman and Pagés-Serra (2000), we assume a discount rate of 8 percent 
and a common layoff rate across agreements of 12 percent, which implies a value of 
0.88  for  δ.  Later,  we  relax  the  assumption  of  a  common  layoff  rate.  Using  the 
industry-specific  rates  for  the  United  States,  we  assign  δ  values  of  0.84  for 
engineering,  0.80  for  retail  and  0.56  for  construction.
7  These figures reflect  the 
turnover  in  the  absence  of  (stringent)  employment  protection  legislation.  The 
minimum tenure with a firm is assumed to be 1 year, and the maximum 20 years. The 
severance pay associated with dismissals with just cause is zero in Sweden; therefore, 
the second term within the second parenthesis drops out.  The severance pay  for 
dismissals without just cause (denoted as damages awarded to the employee in the 
                                                 
6 This differs from the interpretation of Heckman and Pagés-Serra (2000) in which a is the probability 
that the economic difficulties of the firm are considered as a justified cause for dismissal. Because this 
situation is always the case in Sweden and the associated severance pay (S
jc) is zero, implying that this 
term drops out of the equation, we have chosen an interpretation more relevant to the specific Swedish 
context. 
7 The figures, based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, are averages for both manual and non-
manual workers over the period 2001-05. Data were not available for engineering, so the figures for the 
manufacturing of durable goods have been used for this industry.  9 
 
EPA) is defined in monthly salaries by the EPA and is dependent on tenure and age 
(see Lunning and Toijer, 2006).
8 The probability of a dismissal being judged as unjust 
is initially assumed to be zero and then arbitrarily set to 1 percent.  
In Table 3, the expected discounted costs of a dismissal are defined before and 
after the reform as well as for two types of worker: one hired at age 20 and another at 
age 45. Notice is defined  according to the respective agreements and the EPA (see 
Appendix and Table 1). The simple  differences between  the pre- and post-reform 
costs are calculated for each worker type and can be interpreted as the individual 
reform effect for the two types. The difference-in-difference (d-i-d) in the table refers 
to the above difference for a 45-year-old worker versus the difference for a 20-year-
old worker and can be viewed as the relative reform effect across age groups. 
 
- Table 3 about here - 
 
 Table 3 reveals that the firing costs  for both older workers and for younger 
workers were affected by the reform. However, the reform effect is modest for the 20-
year-olds, amounting to a   cost  increase of about 0.3   –  0.7  of  a  monthly  salary, 
depending  on  the  assumed  parameter  values.  For  the  45-year-olds,  a  substantial 
decrease  in  costs,  ranging  between  1.9  and  3.9  monthly  salaries,  was  found.  The 
difference-in-difference between the two types of worker thus varies between –2.6 
and –4.2. The difference-in-difference is larger (in absolute value) in the construction 
sector; otherwise, the variation across agreements and industries is small. The values 
indicate that the reform had a significant impact on the expected discounted firing 
costs  for  older  workers  in  relation  to  young  workers.  The  cost-decreasing  effect 
amounts to 22 – 35 percent of an annual salary, depending on the agreement.  
The effect of a higher layoff rate on the total expected costs is ambiguous. In 
industries with a relatively high layoff rate (for example in construction), the expected 
                                                 
8 For workers below the age of 60, the so-called “special damages” for the case of a dismissal without 
just cause is 16 months of salary for workers with less than 5 years tenure, 24 months of salary for 
workers with at least 5 but less than 10 years tenure and 32 months of salary for workers with at least 
10 years tenure. In addition, two age-dependent rules apply for special damages. First, for workers 
above the age of 60, the corresponding damages are equivalent to 24, 36 and 48 months of salaries, 
respectively.  Secondly,  workers  at  least  45  years  of  age  are  entitled  to  count  each  month  of 
employment past that age as 2 months, up to a maximum of 60 such extra months. This rule also 
applies to workers above the age of 60 who are entitled to higher damages. Damages, in monthly 
salaries, cannot exceed the number of months employed unless the worker has been employed for less 
than six months in which case the damages amount to 6 months of salary. The court can also award 
“general  damages”  to  the  employee  as  compensation  for  psychological  costs  and  non-payment  of 
salary. General damages are not included in our computation of severance pay without just cause.    
  10 
 
firing  costs are higher in the short  term.  However, because  the probability that  a 
worker  remains  employed  also  decreases  faster,  the  short-term  firing  costs  are 
countered by lower expected costs in the longer run. To the extent that firing costs 
increase with age and tenure, the long-term cost-reducing effect is strengthened. Table 
3 shows that the introduction of severance pay for dismissals without just cause in the 
index does not affect any of the reform effects because the rules regarding severance 
pay have remained unchanged in the pre- and post-reform periods.  
 
   
2.3 Other Labour Market Reforms and Collectively Agreed Employment Protection 
Schemes   
Two partial reforms of particular importance to labour market outcomes for older 
workers were introduced on January 1, 1997. One reform concerned stricter rules for 
the eligibility of disability insurance for 60 – 64-year-olds. Labour market reasons (in 
combination with medical reasons) for granting pensions were no longer allowed for 
this group. As pointed out by Saint-Paul (2009), an increase in the retirement age 
could increase hirings among some older workers because hiring costs at a given age 
are  spread  over  a  longer  employment  period.  The  other  reform  was  part  of  the 
legislative changes in the EPA and made it easier for firms to deviate from seniority 
rules (last-in-first-out) when dismissing older workers due to a lack of work. The new 
law stipulated that firm-level agreements between employers and trade unions that 
exempt  workers  older  than  57.5  years  from  the  seniority  rules  no  longer  needed 
approval by a union at the central level. To check the sensitivity of our results to these 
reforms that could affect worker flows for workers between the ages of 57 and 64, we 
estimated separate regressions for the age group 45 – 54, the members of which were 
the primary target group of the 1997 EPA reform but were not subject to the other 
reforms.   
A reform of fixed-term contracts in 1997 allowed employers to hire temporary 
workers without objective reason, but the maximum duration of such work was not 
changed This reform may have increased hirings and firings disproportionately among 
young  workers,  since  temporary  work  is  less  prevalent  in  the  older  age  groups. 
However, we do not have information on the type of employment contract in our data. 
Because of the reform it is possible that we underestimate the effects on workers 
flows in the regressions with younger workers as control.  11 
 
Special employment protection schemes (omställningsavtal) in case of layoffs 
have also been collectively negotiated on a broader scale for manual and non-manual 
workers in the private and public sectors (Andersson, Fölster and Skedinger, 2002, 
Martinson,  2005).  In  relation  to  the  EPA  and  the  industry-specific  collective 
agreements, these schemes imply longer notices and the possibilities to deviate from 
seniority  rules.  Another  important  difference  regards  financing.  The  schemes  are 
financed through insurance fees, payable by firms with membership in the relevant 
employer organisation. Unlike the costs associated with notices, risk pooling exists 
across  firms.  In  2005,  seven  so-called  job  security  councils  (Trygghetsråd) 
administered  the  schemes.  Two  of  the  councils  cover  workers  in  the  collective 
agreements  considered  in  our  study,  Trygghetsfonden  TSL,  founded  in  2004  for 
manual workers in the private sector, and TRR Trygghetsrådet for non-manuals in the 
same sector, established in 1974.
 Because these firing costs are borne by the councils 
and not by the individual employer, the age profiles of hirings and separations should 




3. Data  
 
Our study is based on a matched employer-employee database from Statistics Sweden 
that contains detailed data on Swedish firms and establishments linked with a large 
sample of individuals covering the period 1990 - 2005. Individual, plant and firm-
level-based data are linked together with unique tracking numbers. Information on the 
implementation of notice periods at the industry level is added from the collective 
agreements for manual and non-manual workers. In the empirical part of the paper, 
we focus on hirings and separations in two large industries: engineering and retail.
10 
In each of these sectors ,  we distinguish between different collective agreements 
covering the different types of workers within each industry. 
The database consists of the following parts. First, the individual data contain 
individual  wage  statistics  based  on  Statistics  Sweden’s  annual  salary  surveys, 
supplemented by information from a series of data registers. The dataset encompasses 
                                                 
9 Benefits in both schemes are available for workers dismissed due to the lack of work and are 
dependent on age and tenure. Non-manual workers receiving notices are entitled to counselling and 
coaching during the notice period. When the notice period has ended, the councils provide monetary 
compensation in the form of severance pay (manual workers) or supplements to unemployment 
insurance benefits (non-manual workers).  
10 Construction was excluded due to the lack of data of sufficient quality in that sector. 12 
 
information  on  more  than  two  million  individuals  for  the  period  1990  -  2005 
(accounting for roughly 50 percent of the labour force) and contains information on 
workers’ wages, education, work hours, occupation codes, sector codes, demographic 
data, etc. Second, the financial statistics (FS) include detailed firm-level data. The 
included variables are value added, capital stock (book value), number of employees, 
wage bill, ownership status, profits, sales and industry affiliation.  
Finally, the plant-level  data contain detailed information at the plant level, 
such as employee demographics, salaries, education and codes for company mergers, 
closures, formations and operational changes.  
For each individual in the data set, we observe the notice period (in months), 
based  on  information  in  the  relevant  collective  agreement  and  in  the  EPA  (if 
applicable). The notice period is based on age and/or tenure, depending on the period 
and the collective agreement, which differs for manual and non-manual workers in the 
same industry. 
Our main focus is hirings and separations. The construction of the indicator 
variable for new hirings is based on workers that are newly employed in a firm that is 
present in the data the year before. This condition is imposed to reduce the risk of 
classifying a worker as being newly employed due to the firm being new in the data 
set,  although  not  being  a  start-up.  Similarly,  we  define  a  worker  separation  as 
observing an individual at time t who is not present in the same firm at time t+1, 
although the firm is continuing at t+1. 
Another restriction is that we do not include firms with very large changes in 
the  observed  number  of  employees  between  two  consecutive  time  periods.
11  We 
exclude these large-scale hirings and separations from the empirical analysis because 
we do not want extraordinary events, such as massive layoffs or company mergers to 
interfere with the results. Our restrictions imply that the analysis will be based on 
continuing firms and will not take into account the impact of firm start-ups and firm 
closures.  
The variable definitions and descriptive statistics are presented in Table s A.2 
and A.3  in the Appendix.
12  In Table A.3,  the  means  and standard deviations  are 
shown for the  three different  samples of individuals: manuals in engineering, non-
                                                 
11 More specifically, in our analysis on hirings, we omit firms with a hiring rate above 30 percent in 
combination with those having more than 100 new employees. For separations, we omit firms with (i) a 
separation  rate  above  30  percent  in  combination  with  observing  100  fewer  employees  or  (ii)  a 
separation rate above 50 percent. The results, available on request, are not qualitatively affected by 
these restrictions.  
12 See Heyman, Sjöholm and Gustavsson Tingvall (2007, 2011) for more information on the data. 13 
 
manuals in engineering and manuals in retail. Workers aged 45 - 64 represent between 
33 and 42 percent of the workforce in engineering but only one-fifth of the workforce 
in retail. Turnover, measured across all age groups, is also markedly higher in retail 
than in engineering.  
Figures 2 – 4 depict hirings and separations by age groups in engineering and 
retail.  Worker  flows  are  highly  cyclical,  especially  for  hirings  and  among  young 
workers and manuals. The year preceding the reform is indicated by a vertical line. 
Retail firms implemented the reform for manual workers rather late in the year (July); 
therefore, the year 2001 is likely to reflect the effects of both regimes. For this reason, 
we eliminated the year 2001 from the data in the regressions for these workers and 
use 2002 as the start of the post-reform period.  
 
- Figures 2 and 3 about here - 
  
Figures  2  –  3  highlight  the  tradeoff  that  we  confront  when  analysing  the 
effects of the reform. On the one hand, the differential in the treatment dose is largest 
when comparing outcomes for the 45 – 64-year-olds to those of the youngest age 
group, 18 – 24 (for which the right-hand side scale applies). This observation supports 
using the youngest group as the control. On the other hand, because cyclicality in 
worker flows is quite pronounced among the youngest, the older age groups are more 
similar to the 45 – 64-year-olds in this respect. Also, the pre-reform trends are more 
similar, which is an argument for using 40 – 44-year-olds as the control. We have 
chosen to focus our analysis on using 25 – 29-year-olds as the control – a compromise 
solution to the tradeoff – but we also test the sensitivity of our estimates to using 
several other age groups. For manual workers in engineering, we experiment with 
using  the  same  age  group  (45  –  64-year-olds)  among  non-manuals  in  the  same 
industry as the control. According to Figure 4, pre-1997 trends are reasonably parallel 
for the two worker categories.
13 In engineering, both younger manuals and same-aged 
non-manuals may indirectly  be  affected by the reform for older manual workers, 
through the production process and other spillover effects.    
 
- Figure 4 about here - 
 
                                                 
13 Pre-1997 trends for manual workers aged 45 – 64 in retail (not shown in the figure) diverge 
substantially from those of manuals in engineering.   14 
 
4. Econometric framework 
 
Our  empirical  strategy  is  to  use  a  difference-in-difference  approach  to  compare 
changes in worker turnover before and after the change in EPA. Ideally we would like 
to compare the outcomes before and after the policy change for a group affected by 
the change (the treatment group) to a group not affected (the control group). The 
treatment group in our analysis consists of the oldest age group (45 – 64-year -olds). 
As discussed above we use 25 – 29-year-olds as the control. Our main analysis is 
based on comparing worker turnover for these two age groups. Other age groups are 
to a varying degree affected by the reform, as discussed in Section 2.1. These age 
groups,  characterised  by  different  treatment  doses,  are  also  studied.  Moreover, 
outcomes for 45 – 64-year-old manual workers in engineering are contrasted to those 
of non-manuals of the same age and in the same industry. 
  Based  on  our  panel  of  individuals  and  firms,  we  estimate  the  following 
regression: 
    
             ? ?????   ?    ?          ?? 
     ? ?????   ?    ?      ??      𝑥  
  𝗽      
  𝗿       
 
Our dependent variable in the analysis on hirings is an indicator variable equal 
to one if a worker is newly hired at time t and zero otherwise. In regressions on 
separation behaviour, the dependent variable equals one if an individual is separating 
from a firm at time t and zero otherwise. Treated_Age_Group is a dummy variable for 
belonging to the treated age group at time t, Post is a dummy variable for the post-
reform  period,  and  Treated_Age_Group*Post  is  an  interaction  term  between 
Treated_Age_Group and Post. The coefficient for the interaction term is the d-i-d 
estimate  of  the  reform  effect,  reflecting  the  differential  effect  on  the  age  group 
affected by the change in the EPA relative to the (basically) unaffected youngest age 
group. The d-i-d estimator allows for both group-specific and time-specific effects. 
Furthermore, 𝑥   is a vector of time-varying individual characteristics, and     
is a vector of time-varying firm characteristics. The individual and firm controls are 
dummies for the individual’s  education, the log of  the  number of  employees,  the 
capital-labour ratio, the value added per employee, the share of females and the share 
of  employees  with  post-secondary  education.  The  additional  explanatory  variables 
control for the observable differences between the two groups, which means that they 15 
 
account for the possibility that characteristics are systematically different before and 
after the policy change (compositional bias). All of the estimations include fixed time, 
sub-industry and regional effects in which, for instance, the time fixed-effects control 
for common shocks to the business cycle. 
A  crucial  assumption  behind  the  d-i-d  estimator  is  the  parallel  trend 
assumption. One method to check for parallel trends is to use placebo periods. By 
using data on prior periods, the d-i-d regressions can be re-estimated by studying the 
years  during  which  there  were  no  policy  changes.  If  the  placebo  estimators  are 
statistically significant, then there is a risk that the estimated d-i-d coefficients are 
biased. As a check for robustness, we estimate a large number of different placebo 
regressions. The nature of the reforms during the notice periods makes it possible to 
apply  placebo  regressions  in  two  different  ways.  First,  we  estimate  placebo 
regressions  based  on  prior  non-reform  years.  Second,  the  different  timing  of  the 
reforms  in  different  industries  allows  us  to  estimate  placebo  regressions  on 
combinations of industries and collective agreements that have not undertaken any 
reforms. 
The manner in which the standard errors should be clustered to account for 
autocorrelation and within-firm or within-individual correlations is not obvious (see 
Bertrand et al., 2004). Several alternatives are possible with our data on individuals 
and firms. These options include clustering at the worker, age group or firm levels. 
We have chosen to use the most conservative alternative, which is clustering at the 
firm level.
14 
Another issue related to the d -i-d approach is that the composition of the 
groups of treated and untreated individuals should  be stable over time. The notice 
reform can influence worker turnover by changing  the  behaviour  of  the existing 
workforce  (incentive  effect)  and/or  by  changing  the  composition  of  workers 
(compositional effect). The risk of a composition bias is mitigated in our case because 
we use individual data in which we can follow workers before and after the reforms. 
One potential concern with the estimation of the regression equation relates to 
omitted  variables  bias.  To  account  for  the  impact  of  other  individual  and  firm 
characteristics that might influence results, we estimate specifications with a large 
number of alternative control variables. These variables include controls for the share 
of 45 - 64-year-olds at the firm level and the share of manual workers. Both of these 
                                                 
14 Clustering at the age group or at the individual levels implies t-values that are between 200 and 400 
percent higher, respectively. Hence, the reform effects in many cases become significant.  16 
 
variables are used to account for the possibility that the impact of the change in notice 
period is related to the composition of the firms’ work force.  
Year dummies are included in the regressions as a control for business cycle 
effects  that  are  common  to  all  employees.  This  measure  may  be  too  crude  if 
macroeconomic conditions have differential effects across age groups. We therefore 
estimate alternative regressions in which we add age-specific unemployment to the 
specifications.  
We also estimate more flexible empirical specifications, allowing the treated 
age  group  to  be  on  a  different  trend  than  other  age  groups.
15  When allowing for 
different trends, we include an interaction term between the treated age group and a 
time trend.  
Finally, reverse causality is a potential problem in studies on the effects of 
employment protection. One obvious possibility is that both legislative changes in the 
EPA and their implementation in collective agreements are triggered by deteriorating 
labour  market  conditions  for  older  workers.  Regarding  rules  for  notice,  with  the 
exception of the Engineering Agreement for manuals, our collective agreements are 
constructed in such a way that legislative changes have no effect during the agreement 
period,  which  is  typically  2  –  3  years.  Moreover,  because  deviations  from  notice 
legislation are negotiated mainly at the industry level and only rarely at the firm level, 
decisions by firms regarding hirings and separations can be assumed to be exogenous. 
Another  advantage  with  our  data  is  that  treatment  is  based  on  age,  an  individual 






The  results  for  hirings  and  separations  in  engineering  are  presented  in  Tables  4 
(manuals) and 5 (non-manuals), and the corresponding results for retail are shown in 
Table 6  (manuals). Each table contains three panels with regressions for different 
lengths of the post-reform periods to examine whether the effects of the reforms differ 
in the short and the long term. All of the regressions are based on the same length of 
the pre-reform period, namely three years. Panel a) considers a post-reform period of 
                                                 
15 This robustness check is similar to that undertaken by Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999). See also 
Angrist and Pischke (2009). 
16 This differs from studies of partial reforms based on firm size (discussed in Section 1) in which the 
exogeneity assumption may be questioned.   17 
 
one year, panel b) two years and panel c) three years. In each panel, more controls are 
successively added to the regressions – individual- and firm-specific controls and firm 
fixed-effects. The first four columns in each table display the results for hirings, and 
columns 5 – 8 relate to separations. 
Columns 1 and 5 report the regressions for the simplest specification, with 
dummies for the variables for age 45 – 64, the post-reform period and the reform 
effect (the interaction between treatment group and post-reform period) plus (non-
reported) dummies for region and  year. In columns 2 and 6, individual and firm-
specific controls, commonly included in similar analyses and that could impinge on 
turnover, are added. Columns 3 and 7 restrict the sample to a balanced firm panel, and 
the final specifications (4 and 8) introduce firm fixed-effects. The latter specifications 
control  for  unobserved,  firm-specific  and  time-invariant  factors  that  contribute  to 
turnover, such as working environment. Of main interest is the coefficient for the 
reform effect and its sensitivity to different specifications. The reform effect for 45 – 
64-year-olds is based on 25 – 29-year-olds as the control in Tables 4 – 6, but later we 
will examine the sensitivity of the results to the use of other age groups as controls.  
 
- Table 4 about here - 
 
  As expected, the dummy for age 45 – 64 is negative in all of the regressions in 
Table 4, reflecting less turnover among older workers.  The coefficient for the reform 
variable  is  0.043  in  the  first  column  of  panel  a)  (a  one-year  post-reform  period). 
Taken at face value, this estimate means that the 1997 reform implied a short-run 
increase in the hiring rate of 4.3 percentage points among workers aged 45 – 64 in 
relation to the rate among 25 – 29-year-olds. As more controls are added, the estimate 
does not change (column 2). Columns 3 and 4 show estimates on a balanced firm 
panel. Based on this smaller sub-sample of individuals and firms, the reform effect is 
not very different (0.049). 
  In the longer term, the effect on hirings wanes out and becomes insignificant, 
but is still positive, as seen in panels b) and c) in which the post-reform periods are 
two and three years, respectively. 
On the whole, not much seems to happen to separations for manual workers in 
engineering. Most of the estimates are negative, but in all cases of small magnitude. 
Table 4 thus indicates that there was an initial but short-lived response in the form of 
more hirings without any change in separations.  18 
 
  What  about  non-manual  workers  in  engineering?  Here,  the  regressions  in 
panel a) of Table 5 indicate an initial effect of the 2001 reform on hirings of about 
0.040. In contrast to the regressions for manuals, the effect survives as the post-reform 
period is extended. As for separations, the initial estimate is 0.018 (in column 5), and 
this increase is sustained as the evaluation period increases. Thus, the net gain in 
employment for older workers was initially smaller for non-manuals than for manuals.  
 
- Table 5 about here - 
 
     The pattern of hirings in retail is shown in Table 6. After an initial response of 
approximately 0.020, the effect of the reform in 2001 is strengthened over time, up to 
about  0.050  in  panel  c).  However,  the  contemporaneous  effect  on  separations  is 
somewhat  larger  throughout,  which  means  that  there  is  a  marked  increase  in  the 
turnover but hardly any net increase in the employment among manuals in retail. As 
in the regressions for non-manuals in engineering, we find an increase in separations 
already in the short run, which may be surprising given the design of the reform. An 
explanation  may  be  that  turnover  is  larger  for  workers  in  these  agreements  than 
among manuals in engineering (see Table A.3).   
 
- Table 6 about here - 
 
  To check the robustness of the estimates in Tables 4 – 6, several additional 
regressions were run. One concern with the estimates is that 25 – 29-year-olds are a 
group of workers that are potentially different from 45 – 64-year-olds, in terms of 
unobserved worker and job characteristics, despite being the group least affected by 
the reforms (apart from 18–24-year-olds) and thus not suitable as a control. Another 
concern is that those in the age group 60 – 64 were affected by the stricter rules for 
eligibility of disability insurance in 1997  and that a reform in the same year made it 
easier for firms to deviate from seniority rules when dismissing workers older than 
57.5  years  due  to  lack  of  work  (discussed  in  Section  2.3).  In  addition,  using  a 
treatment group that is close to retirement age may be problematic. For these reasons, 
we experimented with using various age groups as control groups in response to the 
first concern and restricting the treatment group to the age interval 45 – 59 as a way to 
handle the second and third concerns.  19 
 
The robustness checks for manuals in engineering are displayed in Table 7. 
We contrast the results to a benchmark in the form of the specifications in column 2 
of  Table  4  for  hirings  and  column  6  for  separations.  These  benchmarks  are  the 
preferred estimates because the firm panels entail a substantial loss of observations 
between 24 and 37 percent, depending on the industry and worker category, in the 
specifications with the longest post-reform period.  
 
- Table 7 about here - 
 
The estimated reform effects decrease in size and statistical significance as 
successively older control groups are used, which is as expected because the treatment 
dose gets closer to the one administered to the 45 – 64-year-olds. When the control 
group is restricted to 40 – 44-year-olds (the closest age group), no significant reform 
effect is found. Changing the treatment group to 45 – 59-year-olds imply results that 
are basically unchanged. When 45 – 64-year-old non-manuals in the same industry 
are used as controls the estimated effects are small, but insignificant in most cases. 
However, the net effect on employment is consistently positive since the coefficients 
for hirings retain a positive sign while those for separations are all negative.  
Another concern with the benchmark estimates derives from the fact that the 
EPA reform in 1997 affected all of the firms not bound by a collective agreement, 
regardless of industry. Hence, the effects of the collectively negotiated reforms in 
2001 may be underestimated because some firms in the industry had already been 
treated in 1997. This condition is of no concern for manuals in engineering for which 
the EPA reform was implemented immediately, but the results for the other groups 
under consideration could be affected. We have no direct information as to whether a 
firm is covered by collective agreement, but non-coverage is more prevalent among 
small firms and virtually absent in the largest firms. If this aspect is important, we 
expect to find smaller effects in the smallest firms following the 2001 reforms. The 
results  could  differ  depending  on  firm  size  for  other  reasons  as  well,  but  in  the 
opposite direction. To the extent that it is more costly for small firms to adapt to 
employment protection regulation due to, for example, its fixed costs being spread 
over fewer employees, the estimated effects of the reforms may be larger in these 
firms. Thus, we checked for robustness in this respect by running regressions for two 
subgroups of firm sizes, namely those with up to 49 employees and those with 50 or 
more employees. For hirings, the results suggest a negative response in small firms, 20 
 
while the results for large firms come close to the overall findings.  Similarly, for 
separations, results are driven by firms with 50 or more employees  
Another concern with the estimates in Tables 4 – 6 relates to omitted variables 
bias. Year dummies are included in these regressions as a control for business cycle 
effects  that  are  common  to  all  employees.  This  measure  may  be  too  crude  if 
macroeconomic  conditions  have  differential  effects  across  age  groups.  We  have 
therefore experimented with adding age-specific unemployment to the specifications, 
which yields somewhat larger and significant long-term effects mainly for hirings, but 
also for separations. The short-term effects are basically unchanged. Thus, for longer-
run effects on hirings at least, the results are sensitive to the measurement of the 
business cycle. Our last exercise in Table 7 adds a trend interacted with a dummy for 
the  treatment  group,  with  little  effect  on  the  estimates  for  hirings  but  yielding 
marginally stronger effects on separations.
17       
 
- Table 8 about here - 
 
Table  8  repeats the format of the robustness checks in Table  7  for non-
manuals in engineering. The pattern is similar: decreasing reform effects when older 
age groups are used as controls,  less employment-enhancing effects on hirings in 
small firms. However, the results are more robust to the inclusion of  age-specific 
unemployment. Including the interaction between the trend and the dummy for the 
treatment group reduces the short-term impact on hirings, in relation to the benchmark 
estimates. Regarding the results for manuals in retail that are displayed in Table 9, the 
most notable difference in relation to Tables 7 – 8 is that the effects in small firms are 
closer in magnitude to those in large firms, but the former effects are in most cases 
larger. 
 
- Table 9 about here - 
 
                                                 
17 We have also experimented with a number of additional control variables: individual tenure (in the 
separations regressions), the share of manual workers at the firm and the share of 45 – 64-year-olds at 
the firm. The two firm variables are intended to pick up influences on turnover from the structure of the 
workforce (i.e., if firms with relatively many older workers are more inclined to hire such workers). 
These exercises produced small changes in the results. Robustness with regard to gender was examined 
by running separate regressions for males and females. For hirings, the estimates are consistently larger 
for males but are insignificant beyond the initial evaluation period. The estimates for separations are 
insignificant without exception. 
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For a more profound check of the robustness of our findings, we performed 
placebo  tests  on  the  reforms.  We  applied  the  respective  reforms  to  the  “wrong” 
industries or worker categories and to years when no reforms were undertaken. If we 
find reform effects during the placebo tests, then these effects could be spurious and 
consequently  be  regarded  as  evidence  against  the  interpretation  of  the  effects  in 
Tables 4 – 6 as being true effects of the reforms. Tables 10 and 11 report the placebo 
tests, based on our preferred specifications.   
 
- Table 10 about here - 
 
In Table 10, the “wrong” agreements are subjected to the reforms we have 
examined.  Using  the  reform  in  1997  as  the  placebo,  the  results  for  retail  show 
negative estimates in most cases, while the results for non-manuals in engineering 
display a similar pattern to the results for manuals. In the latter case, a significantly 
positive short-run effect (0.034) is estimated for hirings. While this estimate is slightly 
smaller  than  the  corresponding  one  for  manuals  (0.043),  this  finding  raises  some 
doubts about the findings in Tables 4 – 6. One interpretation is that an unobserved 
industry shock, affecting manuals and non-manuals in a similar way, may be behind 
the pattern of estimates we observe.   
However, another interpretation of this result is that there are spillover effects 
from the reform to non-manuals in the engineering industry. Such spillovers could 
exist if the two worker categories are interdependent in the production process or if 
equity concerns make it difficult for employers to treat the worker categories at the 
same workplace differently. For production technology to  affect  our estimates  for 
non-manuals, the interdependency needs to be a specific kind, namely age-specific. 
For  example,  a  decrease  in  the  hiring  costs  for  45  –  64-year-old  manuals  should 
increase the demand for non-manuals in the same age interval but not the demand for 
non-manuals in other age groups. We regard this kind of interdependency as less 
plausible but are not able to distinguish between the two potential explanations with 
the data at hand.
18    
Table 11 presents another set of placebo regressions. Here, estimations apply 
to “wrong” years, i.e., years preceding the actual reform. The overall impression is 
that mostly significantly negative reform effects are estimated, in about two-thirds of 
                                                 
18 Bergström and Panas (1992) find that manuals and non-manuals are substitutes in engineering, which 
supports our interpretation of the results for non-manuals.  22 
 
the cases. For both hirings and separations, only three cases out of 54 yield estimates 
that are positive and significant (at the 5 per cent level).  
 
- Table 11 about here - 
 
Studying the different collective agreements in more detail, we first note that 
the 
short-term  reform  effect on  hirings  is  insignificant  the  year before the  reform  for 
manuals in engineering. A positive and significant reform effect is not obtained for 
hirings  in  any  year  prior  to  1997,  when  the  actual  reform  was  implemented.  For 
separations, a significantly positive effect is estimated in the year 1995. 
 For non-manuals in engineering, both short- and long-run reform effects were 
obtained in Tables 5 and 8.  Table 11 instead shows lack of significant  short-run 
effects when using the year 2000, i.e. the year before the actual reform, as placebo 
reform year. All of the other years preceding 2001 are either significantly negative or 
statistically insignificant with the exception of the year 1999 in which we observe 
statistically  significant  reform  effects  for  hirings  that  are  in  line  with  the  ones 
obtained  for  the  actual  reform  year.  The  corresponding  placebo  regressions  on 
separations  for  non-manual  employees  in  engineering  show  insignificant  reform 
effects for the two years preceding the actual reform. In the placebo regressions for 
the periods three to five years prior to the reform, the coefficients are either negative 
and significant or insignificant. In sum, no positive and statistically significant reform 
effects for separations can be found for the placebo years, in contrast to the findings 
on the actual reform year presented in Tables 5 and 8. 
Finally, the results for manual workers in retail, presented in Tables 6 and 9, 
showed a positive and significant reform effect on both hirings and separations. What 
about the corresponding placebo regressions? The bottom panel of Table 11 shows 
that the short-run reform effect is negative for the year preceding the actual reform, 
but significantly so only for hirings.  For all of the other years, the placebo reform 
effects are either negative and significant or insignificant.  
The placebo exercises show that there are no systematic results to suggest that 
our findings in Tables 4 – 6 can be dismissed as entirely spurious, but we remain 
cautious as to the interpretation of our results. We are inclined to place more emphasis 
on the placebo tests up to 1997 because the results for later years may be confounded 
by notice reforms not observed by us in other industries in the economy. The overall 23 
 
picture  conveyed  by  the  placebo  tests  does  not  change,  but  it  is  notable  that 




In this paper, we have examined a reform of notice periods for employer-initiated 
separations  in  Sweden.  The  reform  was  aimed  at  encouraging  the  hiring  of  older 
workers by reducing the periods of notice for newly hired older workers from six 
months to one month. The new legislation implied minor or no changes in the notices 
for younger workers and was initiated at different time in various industries through 
the  implementation  in  collective  agreements.  These  conditions  provide  ample 
opportunity for the identification of its effects. The analysis also provides insights into 
the implementation  of employment  protection legislation  in  collective agreements, 
which has received little attention in the literature previously, possibly due to the lack 
of data. 
Our  findings  indicate  heterogeneous  effects  across  collective  agreements. 
Despite differences in terms of dynamics and size, a positive effect on hirings is found 
for all agreements. With the exception of manual workers in engineering, our results 
also show an increase in separations, indicating an increase in employment turnover. 
A salient feature of the results is that the estimated effects increase with the treatment 
dose,  i.e.,  the  size  of  the  reduction  in  months  of  the  notices  across  different  age 
groups.   
We  performed  numerous  robustness  checks  of  our  results.  Most  of  these 
checks produced minor changes in the estimated coefficients. However, placebo tests 
with reforms in “wrong” years and in “wrong” agreements reveal significant effects in 
many cases, although with only a few cases with a positive sign as in the original 
regressions. It is notable that significantly positive effects are absent prior to 1997. 
The latter placebo tests are especially interesting since they are not confounded by 
notice reforms not observed by us in other industries in the economy. It should also be 
emphasised that we do not capture general equilibrium effects in our analysis. 
We feel confident in concluding that the reforms did not produce the perverse 
results  established  in  some  previous  studies  on  employment  protection  reform 
targeted on vulnerable groups of workers, through the implementation of firing taxes. 
Our analysis suggests that the Swedish reforms did in no case cause separations to 
increase with little positive effect on hirings. This stands in contrast to the results 24 
 
obtained by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and Behaghel et al. (2008) for the United 
States  and  France,  respectively.  The  more  encouraging  Swedish  results  may  be 
explained by the design of the reforms, which granted extensive protection to workers 
remaining with the firm. However, as the number of older workers under the new 
rules accumulates over time, this particular feature of the reform is likely to diminish 
in importance. Our results may also reflect that voluntary separations among older 
workers were discouraged after the reform because job mobility would entail less 
employment protection for these workers. 
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Figure 1. Unemployment rates, by age, 1990–2005 
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Figure 2. Hiring rates, by age 
 
a) Manuals in engineering 
   
 
b) Non-manuals in engineering 
   
 
c) Manuals in retail 
 
 
Note: Vertical lines indicate the year before the reform. Right-hand side scale applies to 18 –24-year-














1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

















1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

















1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
25-29 40-44 45-64 18-24 (right)29 
 
Figure 3. Separation rates, by age 
 
a) Manuals in engineering 
   
b) Non-manuals in engineering 
 
 
c) Manuals in retail 
 
 
Note: See note to Figure 2.  
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Figure 4. Worker flows among 45 – 64-year-olds in engineering 
 
a) Hiring rates 
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Table 1. Reform of terms of notice for employer-initiated separations in the 
Employment Protection Act, 1 January 1997   
 
I. Rules before the reform, based on age of the employee: 
 
        1 month if age is 24 or younger 
        2 months if age is 25 to 29* 
        3 months if age is 30 to 34* 
        4 months if age is 35 to 39* 
        5 months if age is 40 to 44* 
        6 months if age is 45 or older* 
 
* Applies to employees with a permanent contract who at the time of notice have been employed by the 
same firm for (i) the latest 6 consecutive months; or (ii) at least 12 months in total during the latest 2 
years.  
 
II. Rules after the reform**, based on tenure*** of the employee:   
 
        1 month if tenure is shorter than 2 years 
        2 months if tenure is at least 2 years but shorter than 4 years 
        3 months if tenure is at least 4 years but shorter than 6 years 
        4 months if tenure is at least 6 years but shorter than 8 years 
        5 months if tenure is at least 8 years but shorter than 10 years 
        6 months if tenure is at least 10 years  
 
** Applies to employees with a permanent contract. The old rules continued to apply to employees 
employed by the same firm as before the reform.  
 
*** Based on total length of employment by (i) the same firm; or (ii) firms belonging to the same 
combine; or (iii) firms having changed ownership through acquisitions and mergers. All types of 
employment count, including part-time and fixed-term employment.  
 
 
Source: Lunning and Toijer (2006).32 
 
Table 2. Reforms of terms of notice for employer-initiated separations in selected 
collective agreements, 1997–2001  
 









































July 1, 2001  Various  Various  Various 
 
Notes: Old (New) EPA= rules in accordance with Employment Protection Act up to 1997 (after 1997); 
CA = rules specific to collective agreement for manual workers in construction (C) or for non-manual 
workers (NM) in general. Implementation for non-manual workers in retail varies depending on 
specific agreement. See Table A.1 in Appendix for further details.  
Source: Collective agreements, except for manual workers in engineering, for which the source is   
circulars, entitled “Anställning och uppsägning”, distributed by the employer association 
Teknikföretagen to employers and kindly made available to us by Robert Tenselius at the association.   33 
 
Table 3. Expected discounted firing costs, before and after reform of advance notice, 
for workers hired at different ages. Monthly salaries   
 
Agreement             δ=0.88 
             a=1 
δ= industry-specific 
             a=1 
δ=industry-specific 
           a=0.99 
  Age 20    Age 45  Age 20  Age 45  Age 20  Age 45 
 
Engineering:  






















































   0.842          3.428         0.874          3.847            0.988           3.996 
   1.499          1.499         1.514          1.514            1.629           1.663 
   0.656        –1.930         0.641        –2.333            0.641         –2.333              
             –2.586                          –2.974                              –2.974  
 
 
   1.013          3.798         1.019          4.125            1.134          4.273             
   1.499          1.499         1.514          1.514            1.629          1.663 
   0.486        –2.300         0.495        –2.611            0.495        –2.611         
             –2.786                          –3.106                             –3.106 
 
 
   0.842          3.428         0.881          4.176            0.999          4.330 
   1.499          1.499         1.473          1.473            1.591          1.627 
   0.656        –1.930         0.592        –2.704            0.592        –2.704 
             –2.586                          –3.296                             –3.296 
 
 
   0.796          3.428         0.866          5.017            0.985          5.171    
   1.499          1.499         1.132          1.132            1.252          1.286  
   0.702        –1.930         0.267        –3.885            0.267        –3.885    
             –2.632                          –4.152                             –4.152 
 
   1.013           3.798        0.882          5.016            1.002          5.170  
   1.499           1.499        1.132          1.132            1.252          1,286 
   0.486         –2.300        0.250        –3.884            0.250        –3.884   
             –2.786                          –4.134                             –4.134 
 
Notes: The calculations are based on the job security index constructed by Heckman and Pagés-Serra 
(2000, p. 138). The parameter δ, which is the probability that the worker is not laid off during a given 
year, is 0.84 in engineering, 0.80 in retail and 0.56 in construction. The parameter a denotes the 
probability that a dismissal is with just cause should the case be opened in court. Workers are assumed 
to have a minimum tenure of 1 year with the firm and maximum tenure of 20 years. For more details on 








Table 4. Regressions for hirings and separations, manual workers in engineering, aged 45–64 
and 25–29. Reform year: 1997  
 
a) 1994–97 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Hirings  Separations 
Age 45-64  –0.097  –0.094  –0.094  –0.093  –0.035  –0.034  –0.033  –0.038 
  (11.73)  (11.39)  (10.70)  (10.58)  (9.43)  (9.92)  (9.16)  (10.82) 
Post-reform      –0.032  –0.065  –0.071  –0.049  –0.018  –0.012  –0.007  –0.010 
   Period  (2.15)  (3.78)  (4.02)  (3.84)  (0.97)  (0.88)  (0.60)  (0.85) 
Reform effect   0.043  0.043  0.049  0.049  –0.000  –0.000  0.001  0.002 
     (3.05)  (3.20)  (3.56)  (3.76)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.17)  (0.34) 
Individual & firm- 
   specific controls  
N  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
Firm panel  
    
N  N  Y  Y  N  N  Y  Y 
Firm fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  Y 
No. observations  129,778  129,778  119,167  119,167  126,438  126,438  107,676  107,676 
No. firms  360  360  134  134  427  427  124  124 




  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Hirings  Separations 
Age 45-64  –0.097  –0.092  –0.097  –0.095  –0.035  –0.033  –0.033  –0.035 
  (11.69)  (11.02)  (10.73)  (10.63)  (9.31)  (7.87)  (7.29)  (7.38) 
Post-reform      0.054  –0.002  –0.048  0.012  0.026  0.047  0.063  –0.026 
   Period  (3.28)  (0.15)  (2.41)  (0.64)  (1.46)  (1.36)  (1.42)  (1.73) 
Reform effect   0.008  0.003  0.013  0.011  –0.013  –0.013  –0.008  –0.009 
     (0.56)  (0.23)  (0.84)  (0.72)  (1.56)  (1.78)  (0.99)  (0.91) 
Individual & firm- 
   specific controls  
N  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
Firm panel  
    
N  N  Y  Y  N  N  Y  Y 
Firm fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  Y 
No. observations  170,706  170,706  139,677  139,677  169,578  169,578  131,216  131,216 
No. firms  453  453  109  109  525  525  109  109 
R-squared (adj)  0.041  0.052  0.054  0.066  0.033  0.064  0.081  0.124 35 
 
c) 1994–99 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Hirings  Separations 
Age 45-64  –0.097  –0.092  –0.097  –0.095  –0.035  –0.033  –0.032  –0.034 
  (11.42)  (10.82)  (10.44)  (10.50)  (9.16)  (8.14)  (6.97)  (7.22) 
Post-reform      0.005  –0.007  –0.045  –0.013  0.010  0.016  0.050  0.032 
   Period  (0.32)  (0.57)  (2.28)  (0.63)  (1.01)  (0.94)  (1.65)  (1.57) 
Reform effect   0.020  0.013  0.022  0.021  –0.012  –0.011  –0.007  –0.011 
     (1.51)  (0.99)  (1.50)  (1.37)  (1.75)  (1.78)  (0.94)  (1.29) 
Individual & firm- 
   specific controls 
N  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
Firm panel  
    
N  N  Y  Y  N  N  Y  Y 
Firm fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  Y 
No. observations  208,302  208,302  157,828  157,828  208,063  208,063  147,042  147,042 
No. firms  550  550  92  92  623  623  85  85 
R-squared (adj)  0.036  0.049  0.053  0.062  0.026  0.047  0.062  0.096 
 
Notes: All regressions include regional and year dummies and exclude observations of hirings and separations 
defined  as  outliers  (see  text).  Individual  and  firm-specific  controls  consist  of  dummies  for  the  individual’s 
education, the log of the number of employees, the capital-labour ratio, value added per employee, the share of 
females, the share of employees with post-secondary education and six dummies for sub-industry. Absolute t-
values, adjusted for clustering at the firm level, within parentheses. 36 
 
Table 5. Regressions for hirings and separations, non-manual workers in engineering, aged 45–
64 and 25–29. Reform year: 2001  
a) 1998–2001 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Hirings  Separations 
Age 45-64  –0.217  –0.201  –0.197  –0.201  –0.076  –0.070  –0.071  –0.074 
  (15.80)  (14.21)  (12.19)  (11.81)  (11.41)  (11.68)  (9.98)  (11.32) 
Post-reform      –0.039  –0.048  –0.035  –0.075  –0.003  –0.011  –0.013  0.019 
   period  (2.34)  (3.17)  (2.44)  (4.51)  (0.18)  (0.65)  (0.56)  (0.96) 
Reform effect   0.040  0.045  0.045  0.047  0.018  0.025  0.029  0.021 
     (2.85)  (3.06)  (2.55)  (2.67)  (1.67)  (2.87)  (2.84)  (2.28) 
Individual & firm- 
   specific controls  
N  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
Firm panel  
    
N  N  Y  Y  N  N  Y  Y 
Firm fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  Y 
No. observations  143,108  143,108  113,051  113,051  140,462  140,462  108,013  108,013 
No. firms  736  736  188  188  781  781  170  170 





  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Hirings  Separations 
Age 45-64  –0.218  –0.201  –0.200  –0.203  –0.077  –0.070  –0.068  –0.074 
  (16.34)  (14.41)  (10.79)  (10.29)  (11.89)  (12.40)  (12.06)  (11.78) 
Post-reform      –0.026  –0.041  –0.029  –0.051  –0.014  –0.032  –0.051  –0.009 
   period  (1.74)  (2.21)  (2.01)  (1.95)  (0.88)  (1.69)  (3.89)  (0.40) 
Reform effect   0.038  0.043  0.036  0.036  0.032  0.037  0.034  0.032 
     (2.83)  (3.01)  (1.87)  (1.71)  (4.60)  (5.27)  (5.07)  (4.99) 
Individual & firm- 
   specific controls  
N  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
Firm panel  
    
N  N  Y  Y  N  N  Y  Y 
Firm fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  Y 
No. observations  175,530  175,530  121,037  121,037  173,022  173,022  122,817  122,817 
No. firms  877  877  137  137  925  925  124  124 
R-squared (adj)  0.084  0.095  0.100  0.108  0.025  0.030  0.029  0.043 37 
 
c) 1998–2003 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Hirings  Separations 
Age 45-64  –0.218  –0.201  –0.194  –0.196  –0.077  –0.071  –0.073  –0.075 
  (15.92)  (14.59)  (11.10)  (10.55)  (11.35)  (11.96)  (10.68)  (10.93) 
Post-reform      –0.058  -0.050  –0.059  –0.057  –0.052  –0.056  –0.043  –0.003 
   period  (4.37)  (3.01)  (4.39)  (2.21)  (2.58)  (5.05)  (2.70)  (0.12) 
Reform effect   0.049  0.054  0.049  0.050  0.034  0.038  0.037  0.033 
     (5.01)  (5.07)  (3.40)  (3.25)  (4.08)  (4.67)  (4.37)  (4.47) 
Individual & firm- 
   specific controls  
N  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
Firm panel  
    
N  N  Y  Y  N  N  Y  Y 
Firm fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  Y 
No. observations  206,556  206,556  129,105  129,105  205,354  205,354  130,631  130,631 
No. firms  1,005  1,005  93  93  1,059  1,059  86  86 
R-squared (adj)  0.080  0.092  0.094  0.100  0.024  0.030  0.032  0.042 
Note: See notes to Table 4.  
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Table 6. Regressions for hirings and separations, manual workers in retail, aged 45–64 and 25–
29. Reform year: 2001  
 
a) 1998–2002 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Hirings  Separations 
Age 45-64  –0.212  –0.186  –0.192  –0.188  –0.114  –0.104  –0.109  –0.108 
  (22.63)  (21.40)  (20.56)  (19.07)  (20.47)  (19.96)  (19.42)  (19.08) 
Post-reform      0.011  –0.014  –0.038  –0.033  –0.037  –0.049  –0.058  –0.064 
   period  (0.94)  (1.14)  (2.70)  (2.08)  (6.16)  (8.87)  (7.87)  (7.11) 
Reform effect   0.006  0.018  0.024  0.025  0.036  0.047  0.051  0.056 
     (0.57)  (1.78)  (2.40)  (2.64)  (5.55)  (8.17)  (8.21)  (9.10) 
Individual & firm- 
   specific controls  
N  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
Firm panel  
    
N  N  Y  Y  N  N  Y  Y 
Firm fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  Y 
No. observations  89,035  89,035  69,274  69,274  83,268  83,268  62,985  62,985 
No. firms  930  930  158  158  968  968  141  141 





  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Hirings  Separations 
Age 45-64  –0.213  –0.189  –0.198  –0.193  –0.114  –0.106  –0.111  –0.110 
  (22.74)  (21.46)  (19.59)  (18.60)  (20.19)  (20.42)  (19.51)  (19.15) 
Post-reform      0.001  –0.020  –0.043  –0.025  –0.046  –0.062  –0.064  –0.053 
   period  (0.06)  (1.69)  (1.76)  (1.32)  (6.20)  (71.97)  (7.24)  (6.19) 
Reform effect   0.023  0.034  0.044  0.042  0.044  0.054  0.057  0.059 
     (2.03)  (3.01)  (3.49)  (3.64)  (7.95)  (10.12)  (10.40)  (10.74) 
Individual & firm- 
   specific controls 
N  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
Firm panel  
    
N  N  Y  Y  N  N  Y  Y 
Firm fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  Y 
No. observations  115,602  115,602  81,468  81,468  106,310  106,310  75,034  75,034 
No. firms  1,106  1,106  81  81  1,111  1,111  86  86 
R-squared (adj)  0.080  0.088  0.095  0.108  0.045  0.050  0.059  0.063 39 
 
c) 1998–2004 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)S 
  Hirings  Separations 
Age 45-64  –0.212  –0.190  –0.201  –0.196  –0.114  –0.107  –0.111  –0.111 
  (22.56)  (21.64)  (19.64)  (18.82)  (20.22)  (20.77)  (18.70)  (18.40) 
Post-reform      –0.005  –0.034  –0.048  –0.034  –0.049  –0.054  –0.055  –0.078 
   period  (0.46)  (21.41)  (3.45)  (1.97)  (6.85)  (11.23)  (11.00)  (7.88) 
Reform effect   0.032  0.044  0.058  0.056  0.048  0.057  0.058  0.060 
     (3.14)  (4.29)  (4.81)  (5.02)  (9.29)  (11.36)  (11.31)  (10.76) 
Individual & firm- 
   specific controls  
N  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
Firm panel  
    
N  N  Y  Y  N  N  Y  Y 
Firm fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  Y 
No. observations  142,795  142,795  93,452  93,452  129,517  129,517  83,200  83,200 
No. firms  1,271  1,271  71  71  1,275  1,275  70  70 
R-squared (adj)  0.078  0.087  0.098  0.109  0.044  0.049  0.058  0.062 
Notes: The estimates of the reform effect are based on 2002 as the reform year, and excludes 2001. See also notes 




Table 7. Robustness tests for hirings and separations, manual workers in engineering. 
Reform effects. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Hirings  Separations 
1994–97  1994–98  1994–99  1994–97  1994–98  1994–99 
Benchmark (Table 4)  0.043  0.003  0.013  –0.000  –0.013  –0.011 
  (3.20)  (0.23)  (0.99)  (0.01)  (1.78)  (1.78) 
Subgroups             
    Age: 













  (4.27)  (0.50)  (1.25)  (0.75)  (1.48)  (1.47) 
       30–34 /  45–64  0.029  0.009  0.015  –0.002  –0.006  –0.007 
     (3.36)  (1.23)  (2.26)  (0.37)  (0.78)  (1.09) 
       35–39 /  45–64  0.014  –0.027  0.002  0.004  –0.002  –0.005 
     (2.11)  (0.22)  (0.44)  (0.95)  (0.40)  (0.96) 
       40–44 /  45–64  0.001  –0.009  –0.008  0.007  0.000  0.001 
     (0.17)  (2.11)  (2.04)  (2.57)  (0.02)  (0.29) 
       25–29 /  45–59  0.043  0.004  0.014  –0.000  –0.014  –0.011 
  (3.17)  (0.28)  (0.013)  (0.01)  (1.80)  (1.77) 
       45–64
a / 45–64 
 













       1–49  –0.021  –0.069  –0.061  –0.005  0.007  0.004 
  (0.55)  (2.12)  (1.98)  (0.18)  (0.30)  (0.15) 
        ≥ 50  0.044  0.004  0.013  0.000  –0.014  –0.011 
  (3.24)  (0.25)  (1.01)  (0.05)  (1.78)  (1.76) 
             
             
Additional variables 




















    



















             
Note: 
a Non-manuals in engineering.41 
 
Table 8. Robustness tests for hirings and separations, non-manual workers in 
engineering. Reform effects.  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Hirings  Separations 
1998–01  1998–02  1998–03  1998–01  1998–02  1998–03 
Benchmark (Table 5)  0.045  0.043  0.054  0.025  0.037  0.038 
  (3.06)  (3.01)  (5.07)  (2.87)  (5.27)  (4.67) 
Subgroups             
    Age: 













  (3.20)  (3.16)  (3.15)  (2.48)  (2.78)  (1.72) 
       30–34 / 45–64  0.013  0.021  0.020  0.014  0.024  0.027 
     (1.32)  (2.66)  (2.53)  (2.20)  (4.27)  (4.75) 
       35–39 / 45–64  0.004  0.010  0.012  0.001  0.012  0.015 
     (0.60)  (1.56)  (2.02)  (0.17)  (2.22)  (3.07) 
       40–44 / 45–64  0.005  0.009  0.010  –0.006  0.005  0.009 
     (0.73)  (1.57)  (2.20)  (0.12)  (1.25)  (2.55) 
       25–29 / 45–59  0.045  0.043  0.054  0.025  0.037  0.038 
  (3.06)  (3.01)  (5.03)  (2.92)  (5.21)  (4.73) 
   Firm size:              
       1–49  0.023  0.018  0.015  –0.017  –0.014  –0.020 
  (0.43)  (0.39)  (0.34)  (0.62)  (0.56)  (0.89) 
        ≥ 50  0.045  0.043  0.054  0.025  0.038  0.039 
  (3.03)  (2.96)  (5.04)  (2.86)  (5.23)  (4.66) 
             
             
Additional variables 




















    













         (1.04)  (0.72)  (2.81)  (2.74)  (5.04)  (4.90) 
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Table 9. Robustness tests for hirings and separations, manual workers in retail. 
Reform effects. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Hirings  Separations 
1998–02  1998–03  1998–04  1998–02  1998–03  1998–04 
Benchmark (Table 6)  0.018  0.034  0.044  0.047  0.054  0.057 
  (1.78)  (3.01)  (4.29)  (8.17)  (10.12)  (11.36) 
Subgroups             
    Age: 













  (6.62)  (8.04)  (10.80)  (7.52)  (12.07)  (13.82) 
       30–34 / 45–64  0.028  0.029  0.033  0.025  0.028  0.031 
     (3.35)  (3.39)  (4.05)  (5.52)  (7.80)  (9.61) 
       35–39 / 45–64  0.012  0.023  0.028  0.018  0.018  0.022 
     (1.92)  (3.30)  (5.08)  (4.65)  (5.07)  (7.23) 
       40–44 / 45–64  0.012  0.017  0.016  0.008  0.009  0.009 
     (2.02)  (3.24)  (3.58)  (2.19)  (3.31)  (3.75) 
       25–29 / 45–59  0.017  0.034  0.041  0.046  0.053  0.057 
  (1.65)  (3.01)  (4.07)  (7.86)  (10.08)  (11.30) 
   Firm size:              
       1–49  0.042  0.038  0.037  0.063  0.072  0.064 
  (1.24)  (1.40)  (1.45)  (2.74)  (3.86)  (3.75) 
        ≥ 50  0.018  0.034  0.044  0.046  0.053  0.057 
  (1.70)  (2.90)  (4.20)  (7.78)  (9.67)  (10.97) 
             
             
Additional variables 




















    













         (0.40)  (0.95)  (4.08)  (5.30)  (5.90)  (7.98) 
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 Table 10. Placebo tests for hiring and separations. Reform effects in ”wrong” 
agreements.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Hirings  Separations 
           
Placebo reform 1997:  1994–97  1994–98  1994–99  1994–97  1994–98  1994–99 
Retail, manuals  –0.018  –0.054  –0.073  0.012  –0.013  –0.011 
  (1.79)  (5.24)  (7.38)  (1.61)  (1.76)  (1.80) 















             
 
 
Table 11. Placebo tests for hiring and separations. Reform effects in “wrong” years.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
Placebo reform year: 
Hirings    Separations 
(t-3) - t  (t-3) - (t+1)  (t-3) - (t+2)    (t-3) - t  (t-3) - (t+1)  (t-3) - (t+2) 
Engineering, manuals               
               
1995  –0.087  –0.058  -    0.019  0.018  - 
  (4.31)  (6.79)      (1.83)  (2.59)   
1996  –0.002  -  -    0.010  -  - 
  (0.14)        (1.40)     
               
Engineering, non-
manuals 
             
               
1995  –0.109  –0.133  –0.114    –0.032  –0.019  –0.009 
  (3.63)  (9.73)  (7.42)    (3.56)  (2.62)  (1.13) 
1996  –0.100  –0.065  –0.084    –0.005  0.004  –0.011 
  (3.64)  (2.31)  (3.04)    (0.62)  (0.46)  (1.62) 
1998  –0.057  –0.009  –0.009    –0.034  –0.017  –0.012 
  (2.81)  (0.57)  (0.69)    (3.63)  (2.32)  (1.57) 
1999  0.059  0.033  -    0.006  0.004  - 
  (4.10)  (2.60)      (0.64)  (0.36)   
2000  –0.018  -  -    0.001  -  - 
  (1.22)        (0.05)     
               
Retail, manuals               
               
1995  –0.009  –0.014  –0.017    –0.058  –0.032  –0.026 
  (0.66)  (1.09)  (1.42)    (4.95)  (3.76)  (3.20) 
1996  –0.028  –0.028  –0.053    0.016  0.013    –0.004 
  (2.17)  (2.80)  (5.01)    (1.03)  (1.09)  (0.38) 
1998  –0.070  –0.084  –0.085    –0.030  –0.019  –0.018 
  (6.56)  (9.45)  (10.59)    (3.60)  (2.70)  (2.72) 
1999  –0.070  –0.064  -    –0.006  –0.011  - 
  (6.38)  (6.85)      (0.73)  (1.62)   
2000  –0.026  -  -    –0.007  -  - 











Table A.1. Terms of notice for employer-initiated separations in selected collective 
agreements, 1995–2005  
 
a) Engineering (ISIC codes: 28–35) 
I. Manual workers 
 
Agreements do not say anything specific about terms of notice, hence Employment Protection Act and 
changes therein apply throughout the period. 
 
II. Non-manual workers 
 
Agreements specify terms of notice supplanting Employment Protection Act throughout the period. 
Terms are both less stringent and more stringent than Act, depending on age and tenure of the 
employee. 
 
1. – 31 March 1995*: 
Tenure / Age (years)  < 25  25 – 29   30 – 34  35 – 39  40 – 44  ≥45  
< 6 months  1  1  1  1  1  1 
6 months – 6 years  1  2  3  4  5  6 
6 – 9 years  2  3  4  5  5  6 
9 – 12 years  -  3  4  5  6  6 
> 12 years  -  3  4  6  6  6 
 
* Tenure is calculated as specified in the Employment Protection Act. If the dismissal is due to lack of 
work, the employer must follow the terms of notice specified in special employment protection 
schemes (omställningsavtal). 
 
2. 1 April 1995 – 31 January 2001:  
The rules as in 1) applies, with the addendum that notice should be extended by 6 months for 
employees who at the time of notice, which should be due to lack of work, have reached the age of 55 
and have been employed for the 10 latest consecutive years.   
 
3. 1 February 2001– : 
For employment contracts signed before 1 February 2001, 1) applies, with addendum in 2). For 
contracts signed after this date, same rules as in new Employment Protection Act (see Table 1, part II, 
with addendum in 2). 
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b) Construction   
I. Manual workers  
 
Rules and dates of implementation in the three agreements in the construction sector are similar, but 
not identical. Rules have been less stringent than or identical to Employment Protection Act, depending 
on period and age of employee.  
 
a) Building Agreement (Byggnadsavtalet)  
ISIC codes: 45110, 45120, 45211, 45212, 45229, 45250, 45320, 45340, 45410, 45420, 45450, 45500 
ISIC codes unique to agreement: 45110, 45211, 45229, 45320, 45340, 45410, 45420, 45450 
 
1. – 31 March 2000   
 
        1 month if age is 25 or younger 
        2 months if age is 25 to 35* 
        4 months if age is 35 to 44* 
        6 months if age is 45 or older* 
 
* Applies to employees with a permanent contract who at the time of notice have been employed by the 
same firm for (i) at least 12 months in total during the latest 2 years, or in case of employees at least 45 
years old (ii) the latest 6 consecutive months.  
 
2. 1 April 2000 –  
Same rules as in new Employment Protection Act for employment contracts signed 1 July 1997 or later 
(see Table 1, part II). For employment contracts signed before this date, rules in old agreement (see a.1) 
apply.      
 
b) Construction (except buildings) Agreement (Anläggningsavtalet) 
ISIC codes: 45120, 45212, 45230, 45240, 45250, 45500 
ISIC codes unique to agreement: 45240  
 
1. – 31 March 2001 
Same rules as in Construction Agreement (see a.1) 
 
2. 1 April 2001 –  
Same rules as in Construction Agreement (see a.2).      
 
c)  Road and Rail Construction Agreement (Avtalet för väg och ban) 
ISIC codes: 45120, 45230, 45500 
ISIC codes unique to agreement: None  
  
1.  – 31 March 2000 
Same rules as in Construction Agreement (see a.1). 
 
2. 1 April 2000 –  
Same rules as in new Employment Protection Act for employment contracts signed 1 November 1997 
or later (see Table 1, part II). For employment contracts signed before this date, rules in old agreement 
(see a.1) apply. 
 
II. Non-manual workers 
 
1. – 31 March 1998 
Same rules as for non-manual workers in Engineering Agreement (see Table 2c, part II, 1).   
 
2. 1 April 1998 
–    
Same rules as in new Employment Protection Act for employment contracts signed 1 April 1998 or 
later (see Table 1, part II). For contracts signed before this date, old rules apply as long as these imply 
longer notice (see 1). Same addendum as for non-manual workers in Engineering Agreement applies to 
both new and old rules (see Table 2c, part II, 2).  
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 c) Retail (ISIC codes: 50–52)  
I. Manual workers  
 
There are many agreements in this sector: Retail Trade Agreement (Detaljhandelsavtalet), Wholesale 
Trade Agreement (Partihandelsavtalet) and other sector-specific agreements. Most agreements apply 
same rules regarding notice, namely those of Employment Protection Act (with delayed 
implementation).*  
 
* An exception is restaurant workers in the retail sector, who are covered by separate agreement with 
Hotel and Restaurant Workers’ Union (Hotell- och restaurangavtalet). 
 
1. – 30 June 2001 
Same rules as in old Employment Protection Act (see Table 1, part I).* 
 
* Applies to employees with a permanent contract who at the time of notice have been employed by the 
same firm for (i) at least 12 months in total during the latest 2 years or (ii) the latest 6 consecutive 
months.  
 
2. 1 July 2001 –  
Same rules as in new Employment Protection Act for employment contracts signed 1 July 2001 or later 
(see Table 1, part II). For contracts signed before this date, 1) applies. 
II. Non-manual workers 
 
There are many agreements in this sector, with different rules regarding notice. Many workers are 
covered by agreement below, Tjänstemannaavtalet HTF.  
 
1. – 31 December 1997 
 
Same rules as for non-manual workers in Engineering Agreement (see Table 2c, part II, 1 and 
addendum in 2). 
 
2. 1 January 1998 –   
Same rules as in new Employment Protection Act for employment contracts signed 1 January 1998 or 
later (see Table 1, part II). For contracts signed before this date, 1) applies  
 Source: See Table 2.47 
 
 Table A2. Variable definitions  
       






   
       
Share women  Share of females     
       
L 
 




Capital intensity (Net property, plant and 
equipment)/employees (in million SEK). 
   
Share high-skilled 
 
Share of high-skilled employees.     
Value added/L  Value added per employee (Sales-operational 
expenses excluding wages)/employees (in million 
SEK). 
   









Elementary school (<9 years) 
Compulsory school (9 years)  
Upper Secondary School <3 
Upper Secondary School =3  
Upper Secondary School =4  
University undergraduate 
University graduate 
   
       
New hires 
 
Indicator variable equal to one if an individual is 
newly hired at time t, zero otherwise. 
 
   
Separations  Indicator variable equal to one if an individual is 
separating from a firm in time t, zero otherwise. 
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics, (t-3) – (t+3) 
  Manuals in engineering  Non-manuals  in 
engineering 
Manuals in retail 
  Mean   St. Dev.  Mean   St. Dev.  Mean   St. Dev. 
       
 
Age group 18-24  0.115    (0.319)  0.019    (0.138)  0.277    (0.448) 
Age group 25-29  0.157    (0.363)  0.113    (0.316)  0.157    (0.364) 
Age group 30-34  0.159    (0.365)  0.160    (0.366)  0.128    (0.335) 
Age group 35-39  0.126    (0.332)  0.161    (0.368)  0.106    (0.308) 
Age group 40-44  0.114    (0.318)  0.128    (0.334)  0.079    (0.270) 
Age group 45-64  0.329    (0.470)  0.419    (0.493)  0.251    (0.434) 
New hires  0.109    (0.312)  0.125    (0.331)  0.247    (0.431) 
Separations           0.057    (0.232)      0.070    (0.255)  0.091    (0.287) 
Elementary School <9   0.162    (0.369)  0.022    (0.147)  0.089    (0.285) 
Compulsory School =9  0.182    (0.386)  0.044    (0.204)  0.175    (0.380) 
Upper Secondary School <3  0.441    (0.497)  0.180    (0.384)  0.316    (0.465) 
Upper Secondary School =3  0.196    (0.397)  0.382    (0.486)  0.366    (0.482) 
Upper Secondary School =4  0.013    (0.113)  0.067    (0.249)  0.027    (0.162) 
University undergraduate  0.006    (0.077)  0.289    (0.453)  0.027    (0.162) 
University graduate  0.000    (0.013)     0.016     (0.126)  0.000    (0.011) 
Log firm size  7.637    (1.487)  7.582    (1.556)  7.069    (1.681) 
Share of high-skilled  0.216    (0.123)  0.355    (0.186)  0.127    (0.069) 
Share women  0.228    (0.110)  0.241    (0.105)  0.574    (0.256) 
Value added/L  0.516    (0.301)  0.574    (0.674)  0.440    (0.234) 
Capital/L  0.269    (0.225)  0.252    (0.243)  0.195    (0.277) 
Number of observations  428,757  338,440  407,352 
       
Notes: Figures are based on the same sample of workers and firms as in the regression analysis. See 
Section 3 for details. 
 
 
 
 